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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES v. SHABANI
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 93-981. Argued October 3, 1994-Decided November 1, 1994
Respondent Shabani was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine
in violation of 21 U. S. C. 846 after the District Court refused to
instruct the jury that proof of an overt act in furtherance of a
narcotics conspiracy is required for conviction under 846. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under its precedent, the
Government must prove at trial that a defendant has committed
such an overt act.
Held: In order to establish a violation of 846, the Government need
not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The statute's plain language does not require an overt
act, and such a requirement has not been inferred from congressio-
nal silence in other conspiracy statutes, see, e.g., Nash v. United
States, 229 U. S. 373. Thus, absent contrary indications, it is
presumed that Congress intended to adopt the common law defini-
tion of conspiracy, which ``does not make the doing of any act other
than the act of conspiring a condition of liability,'' id., at 378.
Moreover, since the general conspiracy statute and the conspiracy
provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 both require
an overt act, it appears that Congress' choice in 846 was quite
deliberate. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. ___, distinguished.
While Shabani correctly asserts that the law does not punish crimi-
nal thoughts, in a criminal conspiracy the criminal agreement itself
is the actus reus. The rule of lenity cannot be invoked here, since
the statute is not ambiguous. Pp. 3-8.
993 F. 2d 1419, reversed.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.